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ARTICLES
THE BROOKLYN MUSEUM CONTROVERSY AND
THE ISSUE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED
EXPRESSION*
Arthur N. Eisenberg'
INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1999, the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and
Sciences, commonly known as the Brooklyn Museum, planned
to present an exhibit of young British artists entitled "Sensation." The exhibit--drawn from the private collection of art
collector Charles Saatchi-had been previously presented in
London. The exhibit included a painting by Chris Ofili, entitled
"The Holy Virgin Mary," which depicted a black Madonna
painted on a sparkling gold background with breasts sculpted
out of elephant dung.'
Although several of the pieces in the "Sensation" exhibit
had been the source of considerable controversy when presented in London, the Ofili painting was not regarded by London
observers and art critics as especially controversial. Nevertheless, when New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani learned of
the painting,2 he expressed particular unhappiness with the
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' Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184,
190 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
2 In September, 1999, Mayor Giuliani publicly announced his displeasure with
the Ofili painting and more generally with the exhibit. Id. at 191. In fact, Mayor
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manner in which Ofili depicted the Madonna. He regarded
Ofili's painting as degrading and disrespectful.3
Because of his displeasure with the anticipated exhibit, in
general, and with the Ofili painting, in particular, Mayor
Giuliani tried to persuade Brooklyn Museum officials to withdraw the exhibit.4 When those efforts failed, he announced
that he would withhold from the Museum more than $7 million dollars that the New York City Council had appropriated
to the Museum for fiscal year 2000.' Not content with that
sanction, the Mayor further initiated an action in state court in
an effort to terminate the Museum's 106-year-old leasehold arrangement with the City and to evict the Museum from its
City-owned building.6 Moreover, the Mayor announced that he
would try to block $20 million in construction funds that the
Museum was seeking for major repairs and construction projects, including restoration of the building steps.7 He even
threatened to take over the Brooklyn Museum's Board of
Trustees because a majority of the Board refused to agree to
close the exhibit.8

Giuliani either was aware or should have been aware of the exhibit and its content well before September 1999 because he serves as an ex officio member of the
Brooklyn Museum's Board of Trustees. Id. at 190. On June 18, 1998, at a meeting
of the Board of Trustees, Museum Director Arnold Lehman discussed the exhibit
with the Board. The minutes of the June board meeting were reviewed at the
next board meeting on October 15, 1998, and at that meeting, a complete catalog
of the exhibit was distributed to the Board. Then, at the June 18, 1999 board
meeting, Mr. Lehman and the board further discussed the exhibition. Affidavit of
Arnold L. Lehman at 14-16, Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Scis. v. City of New York,
64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 99-6071-NG). Moreover, the fiscal year
2000 budget request submitted by the Brooklyn Museum to the City's Department
of Cultural Affairs also contained, among other information, a description of the
exhibit. And, in April 1999, Director Lehman wrote to Schuyler Chapin, Commissioner of the Department of Cultural Affairs, "highlighting the controversial nature
of the SENSATION Exhibition." Supplemental Affidavit of Arnold L. Lehman at
13, Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 99-6071-NG).
' Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Scis., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
4

Id.

at 191.

5 See id. at 189-91.
6

See id. at 187.

7 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9, Brooklyn Instit. of Arts and Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d
184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. CV99-6071-NG).
' Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Scis., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
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On September 28, 1999, the Museum sued Mayor Giuliani
and the City of New York in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York.9 In essence, the Museum
claimed that the Mayor had violated the First Amendment by
seeking to punish the Museum for the content of the artistic
expression presented in the exhibit." The Museum requested
injunctive relief to prohibit the Mayor from continuing to retaliate against the Museum for its refusal to withdraw the exhibit." The suit also requested the restoration of the funding
that had been appropriated by the City Council and that had
been withheld by the Mayor. 2 The City responded by moving
to dismiss the suit. The Museum, in turn, requested preliminary injunctive relief."
On November 1, 1999, District Court Judge Nina Gershon
denied the City's motion to dismiss and issued a preliminary
injunction. 4 In doing so, Judge Gershon concluded that the
"First Amendment bars government from censoring works said
to be offensive,""5 that the "City ha[d] ... admitted the obvious; it acknowledged that its purpose" 6 in withholding funding and seeking to evict the Museum was "directly related, not
just to the content of the Exhibit, but to the particular viewpoints expressed," 7 and that "[t]here can be no greater showing of a First Amendment violation." 8
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court prohibited the City from "withholding or otherwise
failing to provide the Brooklyn Museum... any sums of money appropriated, allocated, promised or otherwise payable to
the... Museum"; from "denying, delaying or otherwise
discriminatorily treating pending or future funding requests of
any type as the result of the Exhibit"; from "evicting or seeking
to evict the ... Museum ... from its premises [on] Eastern
Parkway, Brooklyn"; and from "interfering in any manner...

' Id. at 191-92.
10 Id.

" Id. at 192.
12 Id.
Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Scis., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
1'Id. at 205.
12 Id. at 198.
"

1G Id.
17

Id. at 200.

18

Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Scis., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
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with the composition of the Board of Trustees of the Brooklyn
Museum." 9 The City filed a notice of appeal from the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Yet, prior to its resolution,
the City withdrew the appeal and settled the controversy under terms that were entirely favorable to the Museum.
The excessiveness of Mayor Giuliani's response to the
Brooklyn Museum's refusal to withdraw the exhibit made for
an easy case. In expressing his opposition to the Ofili piece, the
Mayor described the piece as a form of "Catholic bashing," and
he announced that "[p]ublic taxpayer dollars should not go for
aggressive desecration of national or religious symbols of great
significance and sensitivity to people."2" But the Mayor's response to the exhibition was not limited to a withdrawal of
those funds used by the Museum to present the artwork that
he found offensive. Instead, the range of punitive action undertaken by the Mayor demonstrated a transparent attempt to
retaliate against a private institution for the views conveyed
by that institution. Accordingly, the Mayor's behavior offered a
classic example of viewpoint-based discrimination in violation
of well-settled First Amendment principles. The district court
decision was well supported by longstanding First Amendment
doctrine. And the City was wise to settle the controversy prior
to the completion of the appellate process.
However, suppose the Mayor had been more restrained in
his response to the exhibit. Suppose that the Mayor did not try
to withdraw all City funding from the Museum, did not try to
evict the Museum from its City-owned building, and did not
seek the removal of the Board of Trustees. Suppose, instead,
that the Mayor had simply said that City funds should not be
used to present artwork that offends many New York City
residents and that, therefore, the Museum should return to the
City those funds that the City had paid to the Museum that
were attributable to the presentation of the exhibit or, more
particularly, the offending pieces of art.
If Mayor Giuliani had adopted this more modest stance,
his position would have provoked a more interesting set of
constitutional questions than those raised by the actual law-

19 Id. at 205.
2'

Dan Barry, On Display at City Hall, 2 Catholics, 2 Views, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.

25, 1999, at B1.
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suit. A more restrained approach by the Mayor would have
brought into sharp relief the questions as to whether, when the
government chooses to fund or sponsor expressive enterprises,
it can impose any restrictions on funded-expression that it
wishes and whether the First Amendment can effectively serve
to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate restrictions on the use of taxpayer monies for expressive purposes.
These questions were critical to a dispute that arose some
years ago when a Long Island school board removed approximately nine books-including Bernard Malamud's THE FIXER
and Kurt Vonnegut's SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE-from its high
school library.21 The school board claimed that it should not
have been required to pay for or make available books that
conveyed political and social messages that a majority of board
members found disagreeable.22
These issues re-surfaced in the early 1990s when the federal government attempted to limit the speech of health-care
professionals receiving federal funds for family-planning counseling." Federal regulations prohibited such professionals
from even discussing the availability of abortion with their patients.24 In defending these regulations, the federal government asserted that it should not be required to subsidize a
message with which many people disagreed, even though such
restrictions prevented physicians from discussing a full range
of medical options with patients.
The issue arose again, a few years later, when various
members of Congress began questioning the extent to which
government funds should be used by the National Endowment
for the Arts (the "NEA") to finance artistic expression that
might offend a considerable segment of the community.26 Congress ultimately adopted legislation that required the Chairperson of the NEA to consider, as part of the grant-making
process, not only the artistic merit of grant recipients, but also

21 See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982) [hereinafter Pico III].
22 Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 41012 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) [hereinafter Pico Il].
' See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 59.2, 59.8, 59.9, 59.10 (1991).
New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 412 (2d Cir. 1989).
2G See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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"general standards of decency and respect for diverse beliefs
and values."27
In each of these situations, government institutions used
the power of the purse to dictate the content of expressive
enterprises. Condemning such practices, critics argued that the
school board engaged in censorship when it removed books
from the library,28 that the federal government inappropriately used funding to tell physicians what they could or could not
say to patients, 29 and that Congress wrongfully injected criteria having little or nothing to do with aesthetics into the process of funding artistic expression."
In fact, First Amendment challenges were directed at each
of these governmental restrictions, and each of these controversies reached the Supreme Court. But in none of these three
cases did the Court offer a clear and coherent doctrinal analysis that would allow for the consistent resolution of these and
other similar controversies. Such a failure is not entirely surprising. Traditional First Amendment doctrine prohibits the
government from engaging in viewpoint discrimination and, in
many instances, content-based discrimination in its restriction
of private individuals and associations using private resources
to convey ideas.3 ' But a First Amendment prohibition against
the government engaging in viewpoint or content-based discrimination cannot be universally and inexorably applied in
every circumstance where the government chooses to subsidize
expression.
The problem of applying the traditional First Amendment
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination to circumstances
involving government-funded speech is complicated by situations where the government has specific policy positions to
impart or views to express, and therefore, it uses public funds
to convey its views. Yet there are other situations where the
government pays for communicative relationships or creates
institutions devoted to discourse and expression where it is

- 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2000).
Pico III, 457 U.S. 853, 859 (1982).
29 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 181 (1991).
20 Finley, 524 U.S. at 580.
31 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828
28

(1995); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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well-recognized that those engaged in expression are not conveying the government's own message. For example, when a
municipality promotes an anti-smoking campaign and uses
public funds to buy billboard space for such a campaign, we
understand the municipal government to be conveying the
government's anti-smoking views. By contrast, when a municipality creates a speakers'-corner in a public park and provides police protection for individuals who use that venue for
political or religious advocacy, we recognize that the views
conveyed by such individuals are not those of the municipality,
even though government funds create the expressive opportunities for these individuals.
The fact that in some instances the government is paying
to convey its own views, while in other instances public-funding is designed simply to facilitate the expressive opportunities
of private persons or associations, suggests that a preliminary
question might be asked whenever one is considering the constitutionality of restrictions imposed by the government upon
the use of public monies to engage in expression. That question
is whether, in subsidizing expression, the government is seeking to impart its own message or whether it is reasonably
understood that the ideas conveyed are those of the recipient of
the funding. If the government's decision to fund an expressive
enterprise does not rest upon its desire to convey its own discrete message, but instead rests upon more general interests in
providing expressive opportunities for individuals or private
entities, constitutional analysis can proceed to the invocation of
traditional First Amendment doctrine. In such circumstances-where the government cannot plausibly claim to be using
its funding authority to convey its own message and where the
speech is understood to be that of the private individual or
group-traditional First Amendment doctrine prohibits the
state from engaging in viewpoint discrimination, and, in some
circumstances, content-based discrimination.
Applying this analytic approach leads to the conclusion
that even if, hypothetically, Mayor Giuliani were to have
adopted the more modest position described above, his position
could not be sustained under the First Amendment as properly
understood. The basis for this conclusion, and the case-law and
historical examples supporting this conclusion, are discussed in
more detail in Part III.
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Before reaching that discussion, and by way of background, it may be useful to consider two matters: how the
Court has responded to the issue of "government-funded
speech"3 2 in three cases where this issue has been raised most
prominently and how leading scholars have treated this issue.
These matters are addressed in Parts I and II. Part IV discusses a controversy, currently pending before the Supreme Court,
that once again implicates the problem of government-funded
expression and the First Amendment principles that constrain
the government when it uses its fiscal authority to limit expression by recipients of government subsidies. The case, Legal
Services Corporation v. Velasquez,33 involves a restriction
that, inter alia, prohibits attorneys that receive federal funds
to represent indigent clients from using those funds to challenge the constitutionality of any welfare law. The issue in
Velasquez is whether this restriction violates the First Amendment. Part IV also applies the analytic approach developed in
Part III and concludes again that the restriction at issue in
Velasquez should be found unconstitutional.

32 The term "government-funded

speech" is intended to describe the circum-

stance where government provides funding or financial support for an expressive
enterprise and attempts to dictate to the recipient of such financial support what
ideas shall be conveyed or what expression shall or shall not take place with
government monies. In this respect, the term describes a narrow sub-species of the
broader circumstance that occurs when government provides financial support for
an individual and attempts more generally to condition behavior on the receipt of
such monies. In the narrow case of "government-funded speech," the government is
simply saying to recipients, "Here is our money and this is what you can and
cannot say with our money." In the broader situation, the government is saying,
"If you take government money, not only must you refrain from conveying certain
ideas with the government money, but, as a condition of receiving such money,
you cannot convey certain ideas even with your own money." The constitutionality
of the more broad and far-reaching set of restrictions by the government is generally addressed by the "impermissible conditions" doctrine. This Article is limited to
the more narrow condition described here as the circumstance of "government-funded speech."
' Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999). The United
States, the Legal Services Corporation, and Velasquez all filed petitions for certiorari review from the Second Circuit decision. The Court granted the petitions of
both the United States and the Legal Services Corporation, but it denied the petition submitted by Velasquez. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 164 F.3d 757 (2d
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1553 (2000).
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I.
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico34 involved a decision by a local school board to
remove approximately nine books from a high school library.
The books included Kurt Vonnegut's SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE,
Demond Morris' THE NAKED APE, Piri Thomas' DOWN THESE
MEAN STREETS, Bernard Malamud's THE FIXER, and Eldridge
Cleaver's SOUL ON ICE. In removing the books, the school
board issued a press release announcing that the books had
been removed because they were "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy."35
In the lawsuit that challenged the book removal decision
as a violation of the First Amendment, the school board offered
a more persuasive defense of its authority to remove the books.
It asserted that public education in elementary and secondary
schools has historically performed an inculcative function; that
in the performance of that function, school officials must necessarily decide what views to emphasize, or even to convey, and
what views not to emphasize or convey; and that, within our
democratic system, school boards bear the ultimate responsibility for making those choices. 6 Moreover, the school board
reinforced this claim by asserting that, in addition to its responsibilities with respect to curricular matters, the board was
also ultimately responsible for fiscal matters; that in the exercise of its fiscal responsibility, it retained the obligation to
decide whether taxpayer monies should be used to convey
particular views; and that as a democratically-elected body, it
was the appropriate institution to decide whether taxpayer
monies should be used to buy or maintain books that, in the
view of the school board, contained ideas that offended a great
many residents.37
In response to these arguments, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary
judgment for the school board, dismissing the First Amendment challenge to the book removal decision. In reaching this
4 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Pico III, 457 U.S. at 857.
Appellants' Brief at 13-21, Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (No. 80-2043).
37 Id. at 35-36.
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result, the district court reasoned, in part, that intrusion by
the federal judiciary into the school board's decision-making
"would infringe upon an elected school board's discretion in
determining what community values were to be transmitted.""8 The court further observed that the issue of whether "it
is a wise or even desirable educational decision to sanitize the
library... should be decided and remedied either by the
school district's voters, or by the State Commissioner of Education on an appropriate administrative appeal." 9
On appeal, a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded the case to the district court for trial. However,
the two judges voting to reverse did so on different grounds.
District Court Judge Charles Sifton, sitting by designation,
based his decision upon the "unusual and irregular intervention in the school libraries' operations by persons not routinely
concerned with such matters."" By contrast, Circuit Court
Judge Jon Newman rested his decision upon the concern that
the book removal decision may have constituted an effort to
suppress ideas and that "a trial [was] required to determine
precisely what happened, why it happened, and whether, in
the circumstances of [the] case, the School Board's actions...
created a sufficient risk of suppressing ideas to constitute a
violation of the First Amendment."4
On review by the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs essentially
advanced two First Amendment arguments. First, they asserted that a school board was not permitted to employ its authority over the content of the school library or over the curriculum
for the purpose of imposing a narrow set of ideological views
and a "pall of orthodoxy" over the schoolhouse and that the
behavior of the school board in Pico evinced such an impermissible motive.42 The plaintiffs' second argument, based on
Judge Sifton's decision, was that the First Amendment requires procedural regularity to insure against ad hoc censorial

38

Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387,

396 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), afld, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
[hereinafter Pico 1].
39 Id.

40 Pico II, 638 F.2d at 414.
41

Id.

42 Respondents' Brief at 10-22, Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free

Sch. Dist., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-7690; No. 619).
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decisions and that the school board's behavior was highly irregular and arbitrary.4 3
By a narrow 5-4 margin, the Supreme Court voted to affirm the Second Circuit's decision and to remand the case for
trial." But the majority vote to affirm yielded three different
opinions. A plurality opinion issued by Justice Brennan was
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens and, in part, by Justice Blackmun. Justice Brennan offered an analysis of the First
Amendment claims that turned upon the school board's motives:
If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents
access to ideas with which petitioner disagreed, and if the intent
was the decisive factor in petitioner's decision, then petitioners have
exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. To permit
such intentions to control official actions would be to encourage the
precise sort of officially prescribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned in Barnette."

Justice Blackmun largely concurred with Justice Brennan
and agreed with Justice Brennan's major emphasis upon the
school board's motivation and the impermissibility, under the
First Amendment, of the school board's exercise of its inculcative function to impose a "pall of orthodoxy" over the classroom.46 But Justice Blackmun declined to join only that part
of Justice Brennan's opinion that characterized the students'
right at issue as the right to receive information.4 7
Justice White cast the deciding vote in favor of remanding
the case for trial. In so doing, however, Justice White offered
no analytic approach to the "difficult First Amendment issues
in a largely uncharted field" that were presented by the
case.48 Instead, he suggested that if the case returns to the
Court after trial, "there will be time enough to address the
First Amendment issues that may then be presented."4 9
Thus, the Pico decision failed to provide any clear guidance regarding the appropriate standards for evaluating First

4' Id.
'
'5
'6
'
"
"

at 31-36.
Pico III, 457 U.S. at 855, 883.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 876-82 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id. at 884 (White, J. concurring).
Pico III, 457 U.S. at 883 (White, J. concurring).
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Amendment challenges in circumstances where the government is subsidizing expression. The plurality accepted the
claim that public schools may permissibly perform an
inculcative function, and therefore, they recognized that some
kinds of content-based decisions are necessary when public
school officials decide upon the content of the collection in a
school library or the books that are to be used in a curriculum.
But the plurality further concluded that the First Amendment
would be violated when such officials exercised their authority
"for the purpose of restricting access to... political ideas or
social perspectives."" In reaching this conclusion, however,
the plurality failed to suggest precisely when, under this standard, a school board would be found to have exceeded its authority or where the line would be drawn between permissible
inculcation of values and impermissible indoctrination. In
these respects, Justice Brennan's opinion concluded, "If a Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, ordered the
removal of all books written by or in favor of Republicans, few
would doubt that the order violate[s] the constitutional rights
of the students." 1 And Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent
and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, "cheerfully concede[d]" this point.52 But neither the plurality opinion
nor the dissenting opinion fully grappled with the question as
to why this intuitive conclusion-one held by at least seven
members of the Court-should have been true.
Matters became no clearer nine years later when the
Court considered Rust v. Sullivan.53 Rust involved a 1970 congressional enactment, Title X of the Public Health Services
Act,54 which authorized the Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") to grant public agencies and nonprofit private
entities financial assistance for family planning services. The
statute contained a reservation, however, which provided that
"[n]one of the funds appropriated... shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."5 In
5o Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"
12
13

Id. at 870-71.
Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
500 U.S. 173 (1991).

P.L. No. 91-572, § 6(c), 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1998)).
" 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1998); Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.
"

20001

THE ISSUE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED EXPRESSION

1988, the Secretary of HHS"6 vastly expanded the proscriptive
reach of this statutory limitation by promulgating regulations
that imposed several restrictions on recipients of Title X funding. Recipients were prohibited from providing "counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning
or [from providing a] referral for abortion as a method of family planning."5 7 Recipients were also prohibited from "engaging
in activities that encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a
method of family planning.""8 The regulations also required
that "Title X projects be organized so that they are 'physically
and financially separate' from prohibited abortion activities."5 9
Several recipients of Title X funding challenged these
regulations. They contended that the regulations exceeded the
scope of the authorizing statute upon which the regulations
rested and were inconsistent with the statute. They also contended that, in restricting what health care professionals could
say to patients, the regulations intruded impermissibly into
the doctor-patient relationship and that they impermissibly
burdened the First Amendment rights of health care professionals to express their professional views and the First
Amendment rights of patients to hear those views."
More particularly, plaintiffs' First Amendment claims
rested upon three distinct, though somewhat overlapping,
arguments. The plaintiffs first asserted that the regulations
prohibited conversations between physician and patient about
abortion, while they did not prohibit conversations about carrying a fetus to term. Therefore, the regulations were not evenhanded on the subject of abortion and, consequently, amounted
to impermissible "viewpoint discrimination" in violation of the
First Amendment.6 1 Second, plaintiffs asserted that since the
regulations conditioned funding on the wavier of a physicians
right to discuss with a patient the possibility of abortion, the
regulations constituted an "unconstitutional condition" in dero-

56 During the litigation, Louis Sullivan replaced Otis Bowen as Secretary of

HHS.
57 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989); Rust, 500 U.S. at 179.
58 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989); Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)).
GoId. at 183, 192, 196, 200.
6' Id. at 192-93.
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gation of First Amendment rights.12 Third, plaintiffs contended simply that the regulations unconstitutionally burdened the
right of physicians to advise their patients.6 3
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected each of these First
Amendment arguments. In addressing the second claim, the
Court read the "unconstitutional conditions" precedent quite
narrowly. The Court asserted that "our 'unconstitutional
conditions' cases involve situations in which the Government
has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy[,] rather
than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct
outside the scope of the federally funded program."" In this
regard, the Court concluded that the restrictions in Rust left
recipients of federal funds with the opportunity to discuss
abortion with patients by speaking with privately-raised money through an "affiliate organization."65 In response to the
argument that the regulations impermissibly burdened First
Amendment-protected communication between physician and
patient, the Court announced that it need not address that
question because the "regulations [did] not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship." 6 This was so, the
Court reasoned, because the regulations did not "require[] a
doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in
fact hold" and because "the doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program" was not "sufficiently all-encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice."67
In its disposition of the case, the Rust Court largely avoided the claim that the regulations amounted to impermissible
viewpoint discrimination. The Court responded, in part, to this
claim by raising the example of the National Endowment for
Democracy and observing that when Congress established that
program "to encourage other countries to adopt democratic
principles ... it was not required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism

62

Id. at 196.
Id. at 200.

Rust, 500 U.S. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 200.
67 Id.
'3
'3
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and fascism."' Yet the Rust Court acknowledged that, in
some circumstances, government cannot justify control over
content simply upon the claim that it is providing fiscal support that enables the expression to take place.69 And in this
regard, the Court cited two examples: (1) government-funded
public fora and (2) public universities. ° But the Court's opinion in Rust never explained why it was appropriate for Congress to engage in viewpoint discrimination when it funded the
National Endowment for Democracy or why it was constitutionally improper to use the government's fiscal authority as a
justification for restricting the views expressed by speakers in
public parks or by scholars at public universities.
At bottom, the Rust Court responded to the issue of government-funded expression by offering incomplete and insufficient explanations for its decision. Rust might be interpreted
as holding that government restrictions on the use of public
subsidies raise no First Amendment problems except in the
limited circumstances where such restrictions run afoul of a
narrowly defined "impermissible conditions" doctrine. But such
an interpretation would be inconsistent with the recognition in
the Rust opinion that public fora and public universities provide examples of situations in which government restrictions
might violate the First Amendment, even if the restrictions do
not violate the "impermissible conditions" doctrine.7 The Rust
opinion never attempted to reconcile these examples or to explain the principle or policy choices that account for the First
Amendment protection of public fora and public universities
and the refusal to extend similar protection to the doctor-patient relationship.
However, approximately four years later, in Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,2 the Court
did attempt to rationalize the Rust decision. Rosenberger involved a constitutional challenge to the criteria employed by
the University of Virginia in subsidizing student organizations
through monies contributed by students to a Student Activities

Id. at 194.
el Rust, 500 U.S. at 199.
70 Id.

at 199-200.

71

Id.

72

515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Fund ("SAF").73 Under university guidelines, SAF monies
could not be given to an organization or activity that "primarily promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[fl in or about a
deity or an ultimate reality."4 A religious organization challenged the guidelines claiming that, under the First Amendment, the University of Virginia as a public university had an
obligation to remain neutral with respect to the expression
undertaken by student organizations and that the University
could not provide subsidies to a broad range of ideological
organizations and, at the same time, disfavor groups espousing
religious viewpoints. '5 The University defended its criteria,
claiming that if it were to subsidize religious organizations, it
would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 6
The Court rejected the University's position.77 In doing
so, the Court concluded that the University's program of funding student organizations was analogous to the government
subsidizing a forum." The Court conceded that "[t]he SAF is
a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense,"79 but it concluded, nevertheless, that "the same principles are applicable."" Those principles mandate government
neutrality and erect a strong presumption against viewpoint
discrimination in providing access to a forum.8 '
In response to the argument that conferring financial
support to religious organizations would violate the Establishment Clause, the Court concluded, in part, that there was no
plausible fear that the religious expression undertaken by a
funded religious group would be mistaken as the expression of
the University. Consequently, the Rosenberger Court recognized a distinction between government-funded speech designed to convey the government's own message and government funds that are transmitted to individuals to convey their
,3Id. at
" Id. at
75 Id.
at
, Id. at
"
78

79

824-28.
823.
887.
828.

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846.
Id. at 830.
Id.

80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Rosenberger,

515 U.S. at 840-43.
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own personal views.
In this regard, the Court re-characterized the Rust decision. According to the Rosenberger Court, Rust rejected the
constitutional challenge to the restrictions at issue because, in
that situation, "the government [had not created] a program to
encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to
transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. 8 3
The distinction fashioned by the Rosenberger Court between the government as "speaker" and government-funded
speech where the government is not understood as the
"speaker" offered a valuable insight for resolving controversies
involving subsidized expression. But the lesson of Rosenberger
seemed to have been forgotten when, three years later, the
Court decided National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.'
The Finley case involved a facial challenge to the standards employed by the National Endowment for the Arts
("NEA") in awarding fiscal grants to artists. In authorizing
such grants, Congress, by statute, initially conferred broad
grant-making discretion upon the NEA, subject to such general
priorities as "artistic and cultural significance," "creativity and
cultural diversity," "professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public knowledge, education, understanding, and
appreciation of the arts."' 5 In 1990, however, Congress
amended the statute authorizing NEA grant-making. The
amendment provided that the NEA's Chairperson was required
to establish procedures to judge the artistic merit of grant
applications and to "take [ into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public." 6
In a challenge to the facial validity of the "decency and
respect" criteria, a federal district court concluded that the
criteria were unconstitutionally vague and enjoined their enforcement." On appeal, a divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed." The court of
Id. at 833.

84 524 U.S. 569 (1998).

20 U.S.C. § 951(c)(1)-(10) (1965), amended by 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990).
8'20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990).
Finley v. Nat'1 Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1471-72 (C.D.
Cal. 1992).
' Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 683-84 (9th Cir.
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appeals concluded that the criteria were not only unconstitutionally vague, but that they also violated the First Amendment prohibition against viewpoint discrimination.8 9 On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. 90

In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court reasoned that
the statutory provisions had been read by the NEA as "merely
hortatory" and that, at least as interpreted by the NEA, the
provisions simply added " 'considerations' to the grant-making
process," but did "not preclude awards to projects that might
be deemed 'indecent' or 'disrespectful'; nor place conditions on
grants, or even specify that those factors must be given any
particular weight in reviewing an application."9 ' And, based
upon this interpretation of the statutory provisions, the Court
concluded that the provisions "admonishe[d] the NEA merely
to take 'decency and respect' into consideration, and ... [were]
aimed at reforming procedures rather than precluding
speech."92 Consequently, it was not apparent that the provisions would "inevitably... be utilized as a tool for invidious
viewpoint discrimination."93
Moreover, the Court distinguished the Rosenberger analysis and suggested that the principles applicable to governmentfunded speech articulated in the Rosenberger opinion were
limited to circumstances involving public fora. In this regard,
the Finley Court observed:
In the context of arts funding, in contrast to many other subsidies,
the Government does not indiscriminately "encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers." The NEA's mandate is to make aesthetic judgments, and the inherently content-based "excellence"
threshold for NEA support sets it apart from the subsidy at issue in
Rosenberger-whichwas available to all student organizations.9

In response to the claim that the statutory provision was excessively vague, the Court observed that "[iun the context of
selective subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to

1996).
89 Id.
90 Finley,

524 U.S. at 590.

Id. at 580.
92 Id. at 582.
93

Id.

"' Id. at 586 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834, 824).

20001

THE ISSUE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED EXPRESSION

legislate with clarity. Indeed, if this statute is unconstitutionally vague, then so too are all government programs awarding
scholarships and grants on the basis of subjective criteria such
as 'excellence.' "95
Thus, it is apparent that when it comes to the issue of government-funded expression, the Court has failed to offer clear
guidance or a coherent analytic approach. The Court's opinion
in Rosenberger suggested an analysis that would shed considerable light on the issue. Nevertheless, the overall trajectory of
precedent-from Pico to Rust to Rosenberger and, ultimately,
to Finley-leaves First Amendment doctrine very much unsettled.
II.
The Supreme Court's failure to offer a coherent and consistent analytic approach toward the problem of governmentfunded speech has prompted scholars and commentators to
address the problem. In a 1980 article, Professor Steven
Shiffrin discussed the issue of government-funded speech."
He examined, among other issues, the propriety of public officials using taxpayer monies to express support for some favored political candidates; to provide subsidies for some, but
not all, artists; and to control the content of curricula in public
schools. 7 Professor Shiffrin considered the traditional First
Amendment prohibition against government favoring some
ideas over others and the admonition of the Supreme Court, in
Police Department v. Mosley," that, in regulating access to
public fora, the government must afford all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard. 9 He concluded that these doctrinal propositions were unhelpful when applied to the various
controversies discussed in his article. Therefore, he urged what
he described as "an eclectic approach" upon the claim that "the
government speaks in too many ways with too many different
effects for too many reasons to expect that general theory can
be an unfailing guide to easy solutions. An approach which

Finley, 524 U.S. at 589.
9' Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565 (1980).
's

'7

Id. at 623-53.

, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
9' Id. at 101.
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fails to pay attention to context will ignore much of impor-

tance."'0
Notwithstanding Professor Shiffrin's insistence upon a
fact-based and contextual approach toward the issue of government-funded expression, his article ultimately tilted toward a
structural analysis that urged adherence to rules of procedural
regularity. Thus, he argued:
[G]overnment [funding of] artistic speech and subsidies to the arts
can be reconciled with constitutional principles if sufficient safeguards are introduced to protect against monolithic decision-making
and politicization. Again an eclectic approach suggests the propriety
of general prophylactic rules designed to accommodate government
interests with first amendment values. Ad hoc decision-making in
particular cases would be ineffective. Attention to the structure of
the government role in the communicative process yields the most
promising solutions.10'

Professor Shiffrin urged a similar approach toward the problem of public education and the authority of school officials to
perform an inculcative function in the transmittal of elementary and secondary education.0 2 He acknowledged that "[t]he
problem, viewed from the eclectic approach, is to fashion a
structure that allocates the decision-making authority so as to
0 ' In this regard, Proaccommodate the relevant interests.""
fessor Shiffrin's structural approach seemed to anticipate the
First Amendment principles of procedural regularity urged by
Judge Sifton in the Pico case.
Professor David Cole has also offered a structural approach toward the problem of government-funded speech. In an
insightful and important essay, Professor Cole argued that
earlier scholarly efforts to address the issue of governmentfunded speech as a sub-species of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine were somewhat misdirected." 4 In this regard,
he noted, as a general matter, that:
[U]nconstitutional conditions doctrine seeks to identify those conditions on funding that have a coercive effect on the recipient's free-

100

Shiffrin, supra note 96, at 610.

101

Id.

at 646-47.

'0'
Id. at 649-50.
103 Id. at 650.
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting
1o4 See generally David Cole, Beyond
Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992).
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dom to exercise constitutional rights on her own time and with her
own resources. The doctrinal focus is on the pressure that the dangling of a financial benefit places on the would-be recipients freedoms outside the funded program. The doctrine's corollary is that if
the conditions do not restrict the recipient on her own time, no constitutional issue is raised.1"5

But, according to Professor Cole, the funding of expression
raises additional concerns. He noted that "[wihen the government funds speech[,] ... first amendment concerns are not

limited to potential coercion of the subsidized speaker, but
extend also, perhaps more importantly to the listener. 0 6

Moreover, Professor Cole recognized that the problem of government-funded speech implicates the question as to when it is
proper for government officials to use the public fisc to express

the government's viewpoint and when it is necessary to insist
that the government must remain neutral. He acknowledged
that "first amendment doctrine can neither insist on across-

the-board government neutrality nor permit untrammeled content control over funded speech." 7 He, therefore, proposed:
[A]n institutional accommodation which would recognize the legitimacy of non-neutral government support of speech, but at the same
time insist upon protecting certain institutional spheres of independence and neutrality as checks against the dangers of government
propaganda and indoctrination. In these protected spheres, government should be required to afford a degree of independence to institutions and speakers notwithstanding the presence of government
funding, toward the end of ensuring a vigorous public debate and
avoiding the perils of indoctrination. In other funded settings, government should remain free to support specific viewpoints and dictate the content of speech.'
The "spheres of neutrality" identified by Professor Cole included "public fora," "public education," "the press," "the arts," and
"professional fiduciary counseling."0 9
Professors Martin Redish and Daryl Kessler offered a different approach to the problem of publicly subsidized expression. In a 1996 article, they presented an elaborate categorical
matrix for analyzing the constitutionality of content-based and

-' Id. at 680.
106 Id.
7 Id.
108 Id.
"'

at 681.

Cole, supra note 104, at 681.
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viewpoint-based government funding decisions. 10 ° The
Redish-Kessler taxonomy divided affirmative subsidies of expression into two groups: "policy subsidies" and "auxiliary
subsidies.""' According to Redish and Kessler, "policy subsidies include situations in which the government either funds
the speech of 'core' policy-making government employees or
makes a political appointment based at least in part on that
appointee's prior expression."11 Redish and Kessler regarded
such conduct as constitutional."'
Redish and Kessler then subdivided "auxiliary subsidies"
into three sub-categories: "categorical" subsidies, "Viewpointbased" subsidies, and subsidies of "judgmental necessity.""'
The authors defined a categorical subsidy as a content-based,
but viewpoint-neutral, decision to fund a category of expression
such as the funding of art, and they regarded such a funding
choice as constitutional." 5 They defined viewpoint-based subsidies as funding based on "the viewpoint espoused by [the]
speaker, such as when the government chooses to fund the
work of a particular artist because she produces art glorifying
the Republican Party," and they generally regarded such subsidies as unconstitutional. 116
The final category defined by Redish and Kessler involved
subsidies of "judgmental necessity.""' By way of example,
they suggested that this category included circumstances
"when the government chooses between two artists applying
for government funding or between two researchers in similar
areas seeking governmental support for their research.""'
Redish and Kessler regarded such financial support as "conditionally constitutional."" 9 They further explained that "[t]he
choice of one speaker over another is constitutional if the government bases its decision on criteria 'substantially related' to

11

See generally Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies

and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996).
...Id. at 546.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
11 Redish & Kessler, supra note 110, at 547.
116Id.
117 Id.

118Id.
119Id.
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the pre-described viewpoint."120

Each of these scholarly attempts to grapple with the issue
of government-funded expression offers valuable insights. Professor Shiffrin's approach is most useful in a case like Pico
where-if one accepts the claim that public education can legitimately perform an inculcative function-various governmental
officials and employees may enjoy a shared responsibility for
deciding upon the views that are to be conveyed as part of the
public school curriculum or, alternatively, decision-making
responsibility might be assigned to some public officials and
not to others. Thus, for example, a school district might establish its rules of governance so that, in the ordinary course,
decisions over the content of a school library are made by the
school librarian in consultation with the school principal and
not by the school board. In such circumstances, a school
board's intrusion into the decision-making process might be
found to violate First Amendment principles of procedural
regularity.
Professor Cole's approach to the problem of governmentfunded speech would be particularly helpful in cases like Rust.
In such a case-at least under the revisionism offered by the
Rosenberger opinion-the government had a message to impart
and tried to use its funding authority to communicate that
message. But, under Professor Cole's approach, such a rationale by the government would not save the restriction at issue
in Rust from constitutional invalidation. Professor Cole would
regard the restriction as an intrusion into an institutional
relationship-the physician-patient relationship-that is deserving of special constitutional protection. Such an intrusion,
according to Professor Cole, would violate
the government's
121
constitutional obligation of neutrality.

.2 Redish & Kessler, supra note 110, at 547.
121 Professor Cole's approach might also prove helpful in resolving a controversy
that developed a few years ago at the Smithsonian Institution. The controversy
arose when curators at the Smithsonian prepared an exhibit relating to the decision by the United States to use nuclear weapons against Japan during World
War II. MARTIN HARVIT, AN ExHEBrr DENIED 50-66 (1996). Some veterans organizations and politicians criticized the historical perspective advanced by the
exhibit's curator, claiming that the exhibit was not sufficiently praising of the role
played by the United States in World War II, in general, and the decision to use
nuclear weapons, in particular. Id. at 238-60. The politicians further claimed that
an exhibit sponsored with taxpayer monies should not present an historical per-
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But there are many cases that can be resolved by conducting a less complicated inquiry because there are many cases
where the government has decided to fund an institutional
relationship or expressive enterprise, not to convey a discrete
message or to advance a policy position, but for other public
policy reasons.'22 Therefore, asking and answering the simple
question, "Who's the speaker?," can often penetrate some of the
confusion that surrounds the issue of government-funded
speech. Professor Cole's thoughtful analysis will undoubtedly
enrich such an inquiry. But, in those circumstances where the
government is not the "speaker," but is simply using the public
fisc to facilitate the speech of private individuals or organizations, traditional First Amendment doctrine can and should be
applied as a limitation upon government using its funding authority to dictate the views expressed. This matter is developed
more fully in Part III.
III.
There are circumstances where government officials have
a message to convey and where they provide funding to convey
that message. In such circumstances, the government may
properly be regarded as the "speaker," and, as the speaker, the
government is free to express its preferred position without
giving equal weight to conflicting views. Thus, for example, the
President can use public monies to conduct a press conference
at which he may express his own views about public policy
matters without presenting an opposite viewpoint. The Supreme Court recognized this proposition in Rust when it ob-

spective that invited any criticism or second thoughts about the decision to use
nuclear weapons. Id. The political controversy ultimately resulted in the effective
cancellation of the exhibit without litigation. See id. at 372-98. But the controversy
provoked the question as to whether it is appropriate for the United States to
establish and support a museum that serves simply as an institution designed to
present only the government's version of historical events and to present only
historical perspectives that are praising of United States policies or whether such
control over the content of a museum's exhibit is inappropriate as a matter either
of public policy or First Amendment principle. Professor Cole's structural approach
may well speak to that issue.
" The most obvious example involves the government creating an area in a
public park for individuals to engage in speaking and demonstrating. Other examples are discussed in Part III.
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served that "[wihen Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt
democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to
fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as Communism or Fascism."1" And the Court
reinforced this observation in Rosenberger:
[G]overnment [is permitted] to regulate the content of what is or is
not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message... [for] when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is
entitled to say what it wishes." 24

On the other hand, there are situations where the government funds communicative relationships or where it creates or
supports institutions devoted to discourse and expression
where it is well recognized that those engaged in expression
are not conveying the government's message but are, instead,
conveying their own views. This proposition was also recognized by the Rosenberger Court. Thus, after explaining that the
government as "speaker" must remain free to support its own
policy positions, the Rosenberger Court was careful to note that
"[iut does not follow.., that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize
the transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends
funds
to encourage a diversity of views from private speak,1
ers.

The most common example of the government providing
financial support for communication by private speakers occurs
when a state or municipality creates or subsidizes a public
forum or a limited forum for individual expression. In this
regard, there is a long line of cases holding that the government cannot engage even in content-based discrimination in
regulating access to a public forum and that, when administering a limited forum, the government can establish categorical
restrictions that define the nature of the forum, but it cannot
engage in viewpoint 1discrimination
within the categories of ap26
propriate expression.

123 Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (citations omitted).

"

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.

125 Id. at 834.
126 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
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These principles were also reaffirmed in Rosenberger. The
Court in Rosenberger cited Mosley in support of the proposition
that "[it is axiomatic that the government may not regulate
speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys."127 In addition, the Rosenberger Court highlighted the
special First Amendment concerns that arise when the government discriminates against speech based not only on content,
but also on viewpoint. Citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,2 8 the
Rosenberger Court emphasized that "[wihen the government
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is
all the more blatant."12 9 And, even in a publicly funded program that was a forum only in a "metaphysical" sense, the
Rosenberger Court made clear that "[tihe government must
abstain from regulating speech when the ... opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction."'
Indeed, the fundamental premise of the Supreme Court's public forum cases is that while the speakers in a public forum
may be using public facilities or public subsidies to communicate ideas, the ideas that they are communicating are their
own and not those of the government.
In this regard, the Court's decisions in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District,3 ' Capital Square
Review Board v. Pinette,13' and Rosenberger are particularly
instructive. Each of these cases involved the constitutionality
of restrictions directed against religious expression. In each of
these cases, the government defended its restrictions upon the
claim that it would violate the Establishment Clause if it were
to provide financial support for religious expression, and, in
each of these cases, the Court rejected the government's defense. The Court did so because the communication that took
place within the public forum was reasonably understood as

384, 390-91 (1993); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 799-800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45-46 (1983); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
"2 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96).
12 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
'

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing R.AV., 505 U.S. at 391).

13 Id.

at 830.

508 U.S. 384 (1993).
132 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
131
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the expression of private individuals or organizations, and the
government was not understood to be endorsing the religious
expression at issue, even if it created the forum or otherwise
provided financial support that allowed the communication to
take place. Accordingly, in each of these cases, the Supreme
Court concluded that the government restrictions amounted to
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment.'
But the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is not
limited to circumstances where government subsidizes a forum
for communication; it also applies to other sorts of communicative relationships and institutions funded or subsidized by
the government. One such example is provided by our public
universities. Indeed, when state-funded universities first developed in the United States, scholars feared that politicians
would use the power of the purse to dictate the content of the
curricula. Thus, Professor Arthur Lovejoy, one of the founders
of the American Association of University Professors (the
"AAUP") and one of the principal architects of the AAUP's
position on "academic freedom," wrote that "the distinctive
social function of the scholar's trade cannot be fulfilled if those
who pay the piper are permitted to call the tune."'3 4 Largely
in response to this concern, principles of "academic freedom"
were developed to insulate the lectures and writings of faculty
members from influence by funding sources, whether such
sources were private or governmental.'3 5
These principles acquired constitutional recognition in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.3 ' Sweezy arose out of an Attorney

"n See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760 ("[Pinette's] religious display in Capitol Square
was private expression."); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35 ("The distinction between the University's own favored message and the private speech of students is
evident in the case before us .... The University declares that the student groups
eligible for ...
support are not the University's agents, are not subject to its
control, and are not its responsibility."); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 ("lUinder
these circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger that
the community would think that the [School] District was endorsing religion or
any particular creed . .
").
"'1David M. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 1405, 1413 (1988) (citing Arthur Lovejoy, ProfessionalAssociation or Trade
Union?, 24 AAUP BULL. 409, 414 (1938)).
'" See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1277 (1988).
1- 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957).
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General investigation in New Hampshire into the subject matter of a scholarly lecture delivered at a state university. In
holding that the investigation was unconstitutional, both Chief
Justice Warren's plurality opinion and Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion discussed the importance of "academic freedom."" 7 Justice Frankfurter, in particular, warned against
the "grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into
the life of a university ... [and in] compelling a [scholar] to
discuss the contents of his lecture." 3 '
Subsequent cases have reinforced the notion that academics have a First Amendment right to remain free from governmental intrusion into scholarly discourse, even if the government is funding the academic enterprise. For example, in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,'3 9 the Court held that the
First Amendment protected state university faculty members
from dismissal based on their allegedly " 'seditious' utterances," 40 or because they refused to sign a certification stating
that they did not belong to the Communist Party. In ruling
in favor of the faculty, the Supreme Court announced that
"[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us .... That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment,
which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
1 42
the classroom."
This concern for government-imposed orthodoxy within the
classroom was subsequently explored in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC. That case involved an inquiry by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") into a
university's peer review process for tenure decisions. The University attempted to resist disclosure of its employment procedure arguing, in part, that such disclosure would compromise
academic freedom.'" The Supreme Court rejected the
University's argument but, nonetheless, recognized the applica-

137

Id.

at 250, 262-65.

13 Id. at 261.

139 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
10 Id. at 599.
141

Id. at 609.

141

Id. at 603.

'4
144

493 U.S. 182 (1990).

Id. at 195-97.
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tion of academic freedom principles where "government was
attempting to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by the university or those affiliated with it." 5 After
reviewing its decisions in Sweezy and Keyishian, the Court
observed, "When, in those cases, the Court spoke of 'academic
freedom' and the right to determine on 'academic grounds who
may teach' the Court was speaking in reaction to content-based
regulation." 14' The EEOC Court also made clear that its reference to content regulation reflected a more specific concern
that government would endeavor to "direct ...university discourse 147toward or away from particular subjects or points of
"

view.

Accordingly, under principles of academic freedom, the
political branches of government may decide whether to fund a
university. They may sponsor a law school and not a medical
school. However, within the context of a government-sponsored
academic program, the scholars and academics must remain
free to pursue their individual academic expression without
intrusion by the politicians because it is well understood that,
when scholars engage in academic discourse, even in a public
university, they are conveying their own ideas and not those of
the state-even though the state may be paying their salaries.
A similar understanding should generally pertain to the
expression undertaken by the curators of art museums. Just as
academic judgments should be left to the academics, curatorial
judgments should be left to the curators. And just as a state
should not use its funding authority to micro-manage the content of a professor's lectures, the First Amendment should bar
Mayor Giuliani from using City funding to dictate the content
of a curated art exhibit.
Asking the question, "Who's the speaker?," provides significant guidance in resolving First Amendment controversies of
the sort described here. With respect to the Brooklyn Museum
controversy, the decisions regarding the content of the exhibit
clearly reflected the curatorial judgments of Museum officials.
The "Sensation" exhibit did not purport to convey the views of
the City and could not plausibly be understood to be doing so.

1'4Id.

at 197.

Id. (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250; Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
147

Id. at 198.
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When the City initially decided to appropriate monies to the
Brooklyn Museum and to other art institutions in the City, it
did so not to convey any particular message but to provide
general support for the arts and to enhance the cultural environment within the City. So understood, the City was not acting as a "speaker" in providing funds to the Brooklyn Museum.
Therefore, traditional First Amendment principles prohibit
City officials from using the power of the purse to dictate the
content of the exhibit.
IV.
The question, "Who's the speaker?," can also guide the
resolution of the issues presented in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velasquez. At issue in Velasquez is a restriction imposed upon
lawyers who receive funding from the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"). " LSC was created by Congress in 1974 to
"provid[e] financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal
proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford
legal assistance." 9 As Congress noted in the original enabling legislation, "[Tihere [was] a need to provide equal access
to the system of justice in our Nation for individuals who
[sought] redress of grievances"' and "to provide high quality
legal assistance to those who would be otherwise unable to
afford adequate legal counsel." 5 ' That need continues. Accordingly, for the past twenty-five years, LSC has continued to
provide financial support to legal organizations around the
country that represent indigent clients.
In 1996, however, Congress significantly reduced LSC's
budget and, at the same time, imposed a set of restrictions
upon lawyers and legal organizations receiving LSC monies.'52 The restrictions prohibited recipients of LSC funding
from representing prisoners, from representing some aliens,
from attempting to influence the issuance of any executive

1..

See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 164 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. grant-

ed, 120 S. Ct. 1553 (2000) (setting forth certiorari question).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000).
15042 U.S.C. § 2996(1).
15142 U.S.C. § 2996(2).
112 Omnibus Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-34, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321. These restrictions are summarized in Velasquez.
See 164 F.3d at 760 n.1.
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order or the promulgation of any administrative regulation,
from participating in a class action, from advocating political
or labor activity, from participating in litigation involving abortion or reapportionment, and from seeking
statutory attorneys'
15 3
fees in connection with any litigation.
Lawyers employed by grantees funded with LSC monies
along with their indigent clients and contributors challenged
the constitutionality of many, but not all, of these restrictions.
In 1997, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, relying on Rust, upheld the facial validity of
the restrictions and denied the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief." On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in all respects, except
one. 55' Writing for the court, Judge Leval held that the provision permitting "representation of a client seeking a welfare
benefit... only if.the representation will not involve any challenge to the propriety of any previously existing rule that led
to the denial of benefits" 55 constitutes a viewpoint-based restriction and is, therefore, unconstitutional. 5 7 In explaining
this conclusion, Judge Leval asserted that the restriction "accords funding to those who represent clients without making
any challenge to existing rules of law, but denies it to those
whose representation challenges existing rules. It clearly seeks
to discourage challenges to the status quo. The provision thus
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint."'5 8
The plaintiffs and the defendants, LSC and the United
States, requested review by the Supreme Court. Review was
granted only with respect to the petitions filed by the United
States and LSC. Therefore, the only issue before the Court is
the constitutionality of the restriction that forbids recipients of
LSC funding from challenging the constitutionality of any
welfare regulation or statute.
In defending the restriction, the United States has insisted
that this controversy should be governed by the same principles that led the Court to uphold the restriction at issue in

1" Velasquez, 164 F.3d at 760 nn. 1-2.

...Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
...Velasquez, 164 F.3d at 769.
156 Id. at 769.
157

Id.

8 Id. at 769-70.
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Rust.'59 And LSC has argued that, in the government-funding
context, the First Amendment prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination is limited to public forum cases and cannot be
extended to the circumstances presented in Velasquez.'"
Both of these arguments are seriously flawed. The suggestion that Rust dictates the outcome of the Velasquez case
should be rejected for two reasons. First, Rust was wrongly
decided and rested upon the Court's avoidance of the central
First Amendment issue in the case. The restrictions at issue in
Rust were plainly viewpoint-based and such viewpoint discrimination could not and should not have been upheld upon the
misplaced suggestion that physicians working in a Title X
program serve simply as mouthpieces for the government. In
fact, such physicians did not regard themselves merely as
spokespersons for the government nor can it be plausibly
claimed that their patients regarded them simply as government messengers.
Second, even if Rust had been properly decided, it is distinguishable from Velasquez. As noted above, in Rosenberger,
the Court characterized the health care professionals in Rust
as speaking on behalf of the government and not on behalf of
themselves when they functioned within the Title X pro" ' If this characterization can be regarded
gram.16
as plausible,
Rust presents a situation that is far different from that presented by Velasquez because a lawyer representing an indigent
client in a suit against the government cannot be similarly
characterized as a government spokesperson.
Indeed, in Polk County v. Dodson, 6 ' the Court essentially rejected the claim that criminal defense lawyers are
agents of the state even when they are paid by the state to
argue on behalf of indigent defendants.'63 In Dodson, an individual convicted after a state criminal trial subsequently
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that a public defender, who was a full-time county employee, had failed to

...See Brief for the United States at 23-24, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez,
164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-6006).
1" See Brief for the Legal Services Corporation at 26-28, Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velasquez, 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-6006).
...Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
162 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
'5

Id. at 319-21.
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provide adequate representation." In dismissing the suit,
the Court reasoned that lawyers representing indigent defendants in criminal cases owe a duty of "undivided loyalty" to
their clients and that this duty precludes such lawyers from
being treated as county agents, even though they were paid
with county funds.16 The Legal Services lawyers before the
Court in Velasquez owe their clients no less of a duty of "undivided loyalty." That duty is incompatible with the assertion
that such lawyers are spokespersons for the government.
LSC is also unpersuasive when it argues, in Velasquez,
that the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination applies,
in the funding context, only when the government subsidizes
public fora. 6 6 This argument ignores the public university
cases discussed above. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Sweezy,
"A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes
the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest."'67
Again, just as academic judgments must be left to the academics, decisions about what legal arguments should be advanced
on behalf of clients should be left to the lawyers in the pursuit
of their "undivided loyalty" to their clients and in the exercise
of their professional judgments.
CONCLUSION
In sum, controversies involving government-funded speech
can often be addressed by asking a simple and straightforward
question: "Who's the speaker?" Our collective experience with
government subsidies supporting public fora and public universities suggests that the government cannot simply say to the
beneficiaries of such subsidies, "If you take public monies, the
government, as patron, can tell you what to say with that
money." Instead, where the government is not truly the speaker and where the government may have chosen to subsidize an
expressive institution or enterprise for a variety of reasons
unrelated to the discrete message conveyed within that institution or by that enterprise, traditional First Amendment princi'"
iC

Id. at 314.
Id. at 322-23.

' See Brief for the United States at 23-24, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez,
164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-6006).
' Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.
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ples apply. In such circumstances, the First Amendment prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and the First Amendment insistence upon procedural regularity come forcefully into
play.

